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Despite efforts to mandate and finance local 
governments’ provision of environmental sanitation 
services, outcomes remain poor in the villages surveyed 
in the four South Indian states. The analysis indicates 
some key issues that appear to hinder improvements 
in sanitation. Local politicians tend to capture sanitary 
infrastructure and cleaning services for themselves, 
while also keeping major village roads reasonably well-
served. Their decisions suggest, however, that they 
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neither understand the health benefits of sanitation, 
nor the negative externalities to their own health if 
surrounding areas are poorly served. Our findings 
suggest that improving sanitary outcomes requires 
disseminating information on the public goods nature of 
their health benefits, as well as on the local government's 
responsibilities. It also requires putting public health 
regulations in place, along with measures to enable 
accountability in service provision. 
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Introduction   
 
Environmental sanitation outcomes are poor in rural India. Surveying villages in the four 
Southern states of the country, we find a shortfall in village cleaning: nearly a third of roads had 
some visible garbage on them, and one in ten drains was clogged. Sanitation infrastructure is also 
in poor shape: less than half the roads were paved, and just over a quarter had drains.   
 
Typically local bodies are responsible for this anywhere in the world, as part of their task of 
providing basic civic amenities. These responsibilities include a multiplicity of tasks, including 
the maintenance and cleaning of various public facilities (including roads, drains, water supply, 
waste disposal sites, burial and cremation grounds), and “conservancy” (preventing unhealthy 
conditions by dealing with such matters as removing garbage, cutting back vegetation, and filling 
in areas where water accumulates).  These tasks are necessarily performed at local level because 
they require a high level of local knowledge and engagement. 
 
In India, local bodies have been given a clear mandate to provide these services. Moreover, funds 
are made available to these local bodies, such that it is not difficult to meet the modest costs of 
hiring someone for keeping roads and other public areas clean. Fund shortages are more of a 
problem for the capital-intensive tasks of paving roads and constructing drains.   
 
Why then are outcomes so poor? There are several possible reasons. Firstly, the system of local 
governance may be poorly designed and implemented. In the next section we summarize some of 
the key gaps noted in the literature in the design and functioning of the system of local 
governance, and in the institutions to support local governments in the provision of sanitation and 
other basic services.  
 
Secondly, citizens may lack information on sanitation. They may lack awareness of the benefits 
of better sanitation for reducing their own and their children’s exposure to disease, with its high 
levels of attendant morbidity and child mortality. They may not know which aspects of sanitation 
pose the greatest health threats. And they may lack awareness of their local government’s 
responsibility for ensuring sanitation. The latter is a reflection of systemic dysfunctionalities in 
local governance, while the former reflect more a broader lack of health education outreach. 
  
Thirdly, elites may capture sanitation resources for themselves. A substantial body of work is 
devoted to the argument that local elites have disproportionately better access to the public goods 
provided by local governments.2 The lack of effective accountability implied by elite capture is 
another reflection of systemic dysfunctionalities in local governance. 
 
We analyze survey data collected in villages in the four South Indian states, to explore why 
sanitation outcomes are poor, and to explore the evidence for systemic dysfunctionalities which 
could contribute to poor sanitation outcomes.  Our paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we summarize the main dysfunctionalities discussed in the literature on local 
governments. We then analyze our survey data and find considerable evidence of elite capture by 
political elites, but not by traditional social and economic elites. Strikingly, we find that elites’ 
decisions indicate a lack of understanding of the externalities and benefits of sanitation. More 
broadly, we find evidence of systemic governance failure which includes shortfalls in 
disseminating information on government responsibilities and the benefits of sanitation.  
 
                                                 
2 Araujo et al. 2008, Dasgupta and Beard 2007, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2006, Galasso and 
Ravallion 2005 
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2. Background on the PRI Act and its sanitation mandate 
 
During the colonial period, village councils (Gram Panchayats – henceforth GPs) were instituted 
as part of a move towards decentralizing government functions. Some of the key functions 
allocated to them were related to sanitation and epidemic control (Tinker, 1967). This included 
protecting drinking water wells, helping control disease outbreaks; collecting data for detecting 
epidemics; and providing civic amenities such as maintenance of roads and drains.3   In the post-
independence period, intermittent efforts were made to systematize the village governments by 
instituting regular elections to gram panchayats.  However, particularly after the 1960’s most 
states neglected the panchayat system, elections were not systematically held and the functions 
and finances of panchayats were gradually reduced, to the extent that in most of the country they 
were merely vestigial bodies. 
 
A concerted attempt to revive the panchayat system that began in the 1980s led to a constitutional 
amendment, passed in 1992, which greatly expanded their role. It created a three-tier system of 
democratically-elected local government below the state government, called Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRIs).  The states were left to decide what specific powers, functions, and finances 
were to be devolved to panchayats (GoI 2004a), but the constitution specifies some “core” 
functions for GP. These include drinking water provision, village roads, health and sanitation, and 
maintenance of community assets for which GPs receive funds both from the central government 
and from the state government.     
 
Thus, for example, in the state of Tamil Nadu,4 the GP’s mandatory functions include the 
maintenance of the drinking water supply, of roads and drains, and of burial and cremation 
grounds, the removal of garbage and overgrown vegetation, the filling in of disused wells, 
insanitary ponds, pools, ditches pits or hollows, addressing other insanitary conditions, 
constructing and maintaining public toilets, and encouraging households to construct toilets.  
Their discretionary duties related to public health include the maintenance of public markets and 
slaughterhouses, and overseeing the conduct of public fairs.   
 
a) Problems noted in the literature on the functioning of PRIs 
 
A series of reports5 have highlighted some problems that typically hinder PRIs from being able to 
function effectively, and the following summarizes the issues affecting PRIs’ capacity to provide 
services, and their accountability to citizens: 
• Overall problems of devolution of functions. GPs have been delegated functions without 
adequate administrative, financial, and technical support. Moreover, there is excessive control 
by the state government, as a result of which PRIs function more as agents of the state 
government than as autonomous institutions 
• Insufficient clarity and differentiation of functions between PRIs at the village, block and 
district levels, as well as with state government agencies and central government agencies.  
As World Bank (2005a) says, “This has created confusion among citizens, undermined 
accountability, and led to the duplication of efforts and the wastage of resources”.     
• Uncertainties of fund flows that make it difficult for PRIs to plan and implement their work 
efficiently, and for citizens to hold their PRIs accountable. PRIs receive funds from a 
                                                 
3 Matthew 2000, Das Gupta and Dyson 2001, Amrith (forthcoming). 
4 Source: http://www.rural.tn.gov.in/citizens_charter_rd_eng.htm 
5 Johnson 2003, De Souza 2000, Jha 2002, Oomen 1999, 2004, World Bank 2000, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007.  
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multiplicity of government sources, many of which do not supply funds on a predictable 
schedule. The central government has sought to mitigate this problem somewhat by directly 
providing PRIs with annual grants for the maintenance of civic services including health, 
sanitation, and safe drinking water.   
• Problems in performance management: Performance standards for many services are unclear, 
and performance monitoring is inadequate, further hindering accountability. Performance 
incentives are also diminished since the devolution of funds to local bodies is typically not 
clearly performance-linked.  
 
b) Additional  problems specific to the delivery of sanitation services:  
 
The problems besetting service delivery by PRIs are especially acute for sanitation services. The 
reasons for this become apparent when we consider, for example, the issue of vector control. A 
high level of organizational clarity and coordination is needed between local governments and the 
several line agencies involved, such as those dealing with health, minor irrigation, water supply, 
and public works. Funds must also be available at the right time: there is little point in trying to 
control vector breeding the week after the breeding season.  
 
In addition to this, sanitation services have other specific needs:   
• Public health regulations.  A clear set of public health regulations, translated into local bye-
laws and backed by credible implementation mechanisms, is needed for upholding sanitation 
service delivery. Citizens need to know what their local government is supposed to do, and 
the local government needs to be able to make citizens comply with requirements for 
maintaining a sanitary environment. Yet Indian states typically lack uniform and updated 
public health regulations (Das Gupta 2005).  Tamil Nadu is a notable exception in having a 
uniform Public Health Act applicable to the entire state --- and it is also the only one to 
invoke this Act when referring to the mandatory duties of the GP (Govt of India 2004b).   
• Public health advocacy and education.  Building public awareness and support is also very 
important for successful maintenance of environmental sanitation. Citizens need to 
understand how they stand to gain from sanitation, such that they can pressure their local 
governments to improve their service delivery. However, the political vision to do this has 
been thin.6 
 
These problems make for poor GP performance in environmental sanitation, and set the context 
in which we interpret our survey results. We turn now to examine what our survey data reflect in 
terms of systemic dysfunctionalities on the ground. 
 
 
3. Study design 
 
3.1. Sampling 
 
The sample was selected from seven districts in the four South Indian states –  two in Andhra 
Pradesh (AP) -- Medak and Chithoor; three in Karnataka (KA) -- Bidar, Kolar and Dakshin 
Kanada; two in Kerala (KE) -- Kasargod and Palakkad; and two in Tamil Nadu (TN) -- 
Dharmapuri and Coimbatore. Districts within states and blocks (sub-district level entities) 
within districts were purposively chosen to control for common histories and cultural 
                                                 
6 Das Gupta and Rani 2004, Mavalankar and Shankar 2004. 
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similarities. The district and block sampling is less relevant for this paper and is described in 
more detail in Besley et al. (2005.) 
 
Each block consists of several GPs, which in turn have between 1 and 6 villages depending 
on the state. From each sampled block, in the states of AP, KA and TN, we randomly 
sampled 6 GPs in every block. In Kerala the population per GP is roughly double that in the 
other three states. For this reason in Kerala we sampled 3 GPs in every block. This procedure 
gave us a total of 201 GPs. From these we selected a village sample. In AP, Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu we sampled all villages if the GP had 3 or fewer villages. If it had more than 
three villages, then we selected the GP head’s village and randomly selected two other 
villages. We excluded all villages with less than 200 persons from our sampling frame. All 
hamlets with population over 200 were considered as independent villages in drawing the 
sample. In Kerala we directly sampled wards instead of villages (as villages in Kerala tend to 
be very large) -- we sampled 6 wards per GP. This gave us a final village sample size of 5277 
villages. For sampled villages, any associated hamlets were also included as part of the 
sample. 
 
3.2. Data collection 
 
The information about the sanitation outcomes was collected in 2003 through (1) 
questionnaires administered to Gram Panchayat members and (2) direct observation of the 
condition of the roads by field investigators. The questionnaires collected data on the 
frequency of actions regarding public health and sanitation and on the allocation of 
responsibility for these tasks. We specified a list of sanitation measures, and asked the Gram 
Panchayat members who was responsible for carrying them out, and whether these were ever 
done in the village. Tables 1 and 2 summarize this information. To collect the direct 
observation data, our investigators first constructed detailed maps of the village showing all 
the roads and paths. They then assessed the condition of each road along the dimensions 
detailed in Table 3, and noted the characteristics of the inhabitants by the side of that road. In 
particular they noted the caste and religion of the inhabitants, whether they were GP 
members, and whether important village institutions such as schools, health centers, were by 
the side of the road. Compared with the respondents’ reported perception of whether a task 
was ever done, the direct observation data give us much more objective information on the 
actual sanitary conditions on the ground. 
 
In addition to the sanitation outcomes, we have additional village-level information, collected 
in a previous survey conducted the previous year in 2002. This information was collected 
from the official census (population, literacy, area), interviews with GP members (whether 
the village is the GP headquarter and whether the village is the GP president’s village), and 
from participatory appraisal methods (the fraction Scheduled Castes/Tribes in the village, the 
fraction land owned by the upper castes, and oligarchy – the extent to which the GP members 
control the important functions in the village.) 
 
 
4. Analytical Methods 
 
To analyze the determinants of information about GP responsibilities we use the village level 
data. To examine the inter- and intra-village distribution of sanitation outcomes we use the road 
level dataset onto which we merged the village level information. Hence, the unit of observation 
                                                 
7 The state-wise break up is AP: 69 villages, KA: 182 villages, KE: 126 wards; TN 129 villages. 
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is the road. Our method of analysis is the multivariate linear regression estimated with ordinary 
least squares. In the information regressions our dependent variable is whether the GP is viewed 
as responsible for the specific tasks summarized in Table 2. In the distribution regressions our 
dependent variables are the road level sanitation outcomes summarized in Table 3. In addition, 
our dependent variables are binary (i.e. yes-no, codified as 1-0) and we are using a linear 
probability model. Our explanatory variables are broken up into the following categories. 
 
(a) Village characteristics that might be expected to be associated with greater access to 
information about Gram Panchayat responsibilities and resources: 
o Higher proportions literate  
o Village which is the GP headquarters  
 
(b) Village-level factors that might be expected to be associated with lower popular awareness of 
the roles of modern local government institutions:   
o Villages with oligarchic control of resources and power  
o Villages where the upper castes own a higher proportion of the land  
o Villages with a higher proportion of scheduled castes/tribes 
 
(c) Villages with greater sanitation needs because of demographic pressures (making for higher 
production of garbage, and greater crowding which increases the health risks from poor 
sanitation): 
o Villages with larger population size 
o Villages with higher population density  
 
(d) Roads inhabited by socially excluded groups: Compared with roads inhabited by the upper 
castes, those inhabited by  
o Scheduled castes/tribes  
o Mixed castes  
o Muslims  
 
(e) Important village roads which might be expected to receive priority in terms of infrastructure:  
o Roads which are longer or have key institutions (school, bank, or post office)  
o Long roads, i.e. major village roads 
 
(f) Villages/roads with strong political connections: 
o Gram panchayat head lives in the village 
o Politician lives on that road 
 
In these regressions we use “fixed effects” – dummy variables that control for variation across 
geographic entities.  When we want to emphasize the village level variables, the regressions are 
estimated with block fixed-effects, which means that we are estimating effects across villages 
within the same block, controlling for variations across blocks, which allows us to analyze the 
inter-village distribution of sanitation outcomes within a block. We use village fixed effects when 
we want to emphasize the road level variables which determine the intra-village distribution.  
With village fixed effects, our analysis focuses on estimating the differences in outcomes across 
roads in the same village – controlling for any variation at the village level, or at higher levels. 
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5. Results   
 
5.1  How aware are Gram Panchayat (GP) members of the GP’s responsibilities for 
sanitation? 
 
Table 2 lists a set of local sanitation functions that are solidly within the PRI Act’s mandate for 
GPs. The most striking aspect of this table is that there is some confusion on GP responsibility for 
all these tasks, although the Gram Panchayat is reported by the majority of respondents to be 
responsible for carrying out each of these tasks.   
 
The tasks with the four highest (80-86%) awareness of GP responsibility are cleaning drinking 
water tanks, roads, and drains, and spraying for mosquitoes (Table 2), with drinking water 
chlorination following closely behind. The provision of safe drinking water has been a high 
priority national program since the 1970s, as has the malaria program’s mosquito-spraying 
campaigns. Roads and drains get some attention from the higher authorities, since they are 
capital-intensive investments with high political payoff. By contrast, garbage disposal and 
clearing accumulated water have not been the focus of major national or state efforts, and perhaps 
for this reason they rank lowest in awareness of GP responsibility despite the fact that both of 
these are fundamental functions of local governments. 
 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2 we can see that an increased confusion is associated with a lower 
likelihood of the task being reported to have ever been done. However, the data do not allow us to 
draw any conclusion about the causal relationship between confusion and (lack of) action. Among 
the tasks with the four highest awareness of GP responsibility, three are also in the top four in the 
action ranking. In particular, cleaning the water tanks is the top ranked task in the responsibility 
and action ranking. In the action rankings, the two actions pertaining to providing safe drinking 
water rank the highest. The high responsibility rankings of road and drain cleaning is also 
consistent with the fact that Table 3 indicates that efforts are made to keep roads and drains at 
least moderately clean.  
 
The similarities extend to the bottom of the ranking as well. Garbage disposal is the task on which 
there is greatest confusion and the least frequent action. Only 61% of respondents stated that the 
GP is responsible for this, and nearly a third actually said they did not know who was responsible 
for this task. 14% of respondents thought that higher levels of PRIs are responsible for clearing 
water accumulation in their villages, although it is not possible for people outside the locality to 
know what water accumulates where and under what conditions, and therefore make 
arrangements to manage the water accumulation. The confusion about garbage disposal is also 
consistent with the interviewers’ observation that the poorest sanitation outcome pertains to 
garbage on roads (Table 3).  
 
Table 4 analyzes the village characteristics associated with being better informed about GP 
responsibility for these tasks. Some interesting results emerge. 
 
Firstly, villages with characteristics that might be expected to raise awareness of GP 
responsibilities do not seem to have much greater awareness than others.  Villages with higher 
proportions literate are better informed only of GP responsibility for one task (cleaning drinking 
water tanks).  Villages which might be expected to be exposed to more information about GP 
roles, either because the GP head lives there or because they are the GP headquarters where GP 
meetings are held, show little difference from other villages in their awareness of GP 
responsibilities, except with regard to cleaning drinking water tanks. 
 
 6
The same applies to factors that might be expected to be associated with lower popular awareness 
of the roles of modern local government institutions. Villages with oligarchic structures, those 
with high proportions of land controlled by the upper castes, and those with a high proportion of 
scheduled castes or scheduled tribes show little consistent evidence of being less informed than 
other villages. 
 
A more consistent pattern of greater awareness of GP responsibility for sanitation tasks is shown 
only by villages with larger populations. These villages show significantly greater awareness of 
GP responsibility for garbage disposal and road cleaning, but possibly lower awareness of their 
responsibility for cleaning drinking water tanks.  This suggests that larger villages receive more 
attention in terms of sanitation services, as should be the case given their greater need for these 
services.  Villages which are more densely populated also show some (limited) evidence of 
greater awareness of GP responsibility for managing their drinking water safety and anti-malarial 
spraying. 
 
 
5.2   Who is better served with road infrastructure and sanitation? 
 
In Table 5 we examine the determinants of the inter-village distribution of sanitation benefits. To 
take into account variations in geography and across higher level government institutions we 
include block fixed effects in our estimation8. 
 
We find that village characteristics that might be expected to be associated with greater access to 
information make little difference to these outcomes. Having higher proportions literate makes no 
difference, and living in the village which is the Gram Panchayat headquarters is associated only 
with a greater likelihood of having paved roads. This latter result could well be because villages 
with better facilities are more likely to be selected to the Gram Panchayat headquarters in the first 
place. 
 
Village-level factors that might be expected to be associated with lower popular awareness of the 
roles of modern local government institutions also show limited difference in outcomes compared 
with other villages. Oligarchic control of resources and power makes no difference, while villages 
where the upper castes own a higher proportion of the land are only more likely to do better in 
one outcome (moderately clean roads). Villages with a higher proportion of scheduled 
castes/tribes show mixed results: their roads are significantly more likely to be free of garbage, 
but their drains are significantly more likely to be clogged.  
 
There is some limited evidence of effort to meet the greater sanitation needs of villages with 
larger or denser populations. In terms of infrastructure, we find only that villages with a more 
dense population are more likely to have drains and moderately clean roads. However, these 
villages are also more likely to have clogged drains. Villages with larger populations do not have 
an advantage in infrastructure, and there is evidence that their roads are more likely to have 
garbage on them.  Of course, it needs to be borne in mind that more populous villages generate 
more garbage. 
 
By contrast, there is strong evidence that the Gram Panchayat head’s village is likely to be 
privileged in terms of sanitation. This in both in terms of infrastructure – more likely to be paved 
                                                 
8 We include the road level variables in the Table 4 estimation, but for the sake of brevity we do not report 
their coefficients. The coefficients are very close to those in Table 5 and their significance level does not 
change. 
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and to have drains, and in terms of cleanliness – more likely to be moderately clean, and free of 
garbage. However, it is notable that drains in these villages are no less likely to be clogged than 
elsewhere.  One possibility this suggests is that Gram Panchayat heads’ have limited awareness of 
what improves sanitation and health outcomes, as opposed to the more aesthetic aspects of having 
roads that have upscale infrastructure and are kept well-swept.  Another possibility is that the 
village electorate is much more responsive to visible public goods rather than more invisible 
aspects of public health and sanitation, and village politicians therefore act accordingly in making 
decisions to support their constituencies.    
 
In Table 6 we examine the determinants of intra-village distribution of sanitation outcomes. To 
remove all variation due to village level characteristics we include village fixed effects in the 
estimation9. 
 
Social exclusion plays a limited role. Roads inhabited by scheduled castes/tribes are significantly 
less likely to be paved as compared with roads inhabited by the upper castes, and more likely to 
have garbage on them.  Other than this, caste and religion seem to play little role in determining 
the conditions of the roads that people live on. Roads inhabited by mixed castes are more likely to 
be paved than those of the upper castes. Roads inhabited by Muslims are not significantly 
different from those inhabited by the upper castes. 
 
Important roads receive priority in terms of infrastructure: roads which are longer (i.e. are major 
village roads) or have key institutions (school, bank, or post office) on them are significantly 
more likely to be paved, and to have drains. However, these important roads show much weaker 
evidence of receiving more attention in terms of cleaning, and that too along only one of the three 
indices of cleaning analyzed here.   
 
Political connections again make a large difference. Roads where politicians are resident show 
evidence of significantly better infrastructure, being more likely to have drains and to be paved. 
Their roads are also more likely to be moderately clean. 
 
 
Discussion   
 
We find that people are largely informed about the local bodies’ responsibility for keeping the 
village clean, with the notable exceptions of garbage disposal and clearing accumulated water.  
Yet there is little significant informational advantage amongst villages which are better placed to 
know of these roles, such as villages with higher proportions literate, where the Gram Panchayat 
headquarters are located, or even where the Gram Panchayat head lives. Nor do these villages 
show better sanitation outcomes than others. Given that there has been a major expansion of 
Gram Panchayat roles in the previous decade, one would expect that such villages would have an 
initial advantage in terms of information, and greater citizen pressure to improve outcomes. This 
suggests the possibility that respondents know of the Gram Panchayats’ sanitation roles because 
these are longstanding roles over the past century, and that the new PRI system has failed to 
inform people adequately about its newly-enhanced roles and powers.   
 
We find strong evidence of capture of sanitation infrastructure and services by politicians. The 
scarce resources for paving roads and constructing drains are allocated overwhelmingly to those 
with political clout: infrastructure is better in the Gram Panchayat head’s village, and on the roads 
                                                 
9 Naturally, this also removes all the geographic and upper level institutional variation that were previously 
removed through block fixed effects. 
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on which politicians live. The Gram Panchayat head’s village also does significantly better along 
all the cleanliness dimensions except that of keeping drains clear. No other category of village or 
road appears to benefit in this way. Politician’s roads are less privileged in terms of cleaning than 
in infrastructure provision, and do better along only one of the three measures of cleanliness.   
This indicates sanitation services are determined along political lines and serve the needs of 
village politicians – strong evidence for political capture. 
 
The good news is that traditional social elites’ ability to corner resources for themselves seems to 
have almost completely eroded.  Compared with roads inhabited by upper caste households, those 
inhabited by scheduled castes and tribes were less likely to be paved and to have fewer roads with 
no garbage on them ⎯ but this does not apply to the other potentially socially excluded 
categories examined.  Also, villages with characteristics associated with a concentration of power 
(oligarchic villages and those where the upper castes hold most of the land), or with a 
concentration of traditionally disempowered people (fraction of the population that is from the 
lowest castes and tribes) show no significant difference from other villages in terms of 
infrastructure, and limited evidence of difference in terms of cleaning.  
 
Impersonal considerations do play a role in the allocation of resources for infrastructure.  Roads 
are more likely to be paved and have drains if they are long roads (major village roads) or have 
major institutions located on them. However, these roads do better only in terms of one of our 
three measures of cleanliness. Another indication of impersonal considerations is that more 
densely populated villages are more likely to have drains and moderately clean roads.  However, 
these villages do not do better on the other indices of cleanliness. On the whole, we find limited 
evidence that villages are better served if they have greater sanitary needs because of 
demographic pressures.   
 
The bottom line seems to be that local politicians take some trouble to make sure that their own 
residential areas are paved and have drains, and that their roads are kept clean.  They see to it that 
important village roads are paved and have drains, but are less careful to make sure they are kept 
clean. However, they do not take the actions that would indicate an appreciation of the health 
benefits of sanitation, such as an awareness of the negative externalities they themselves face 
from having people around them live in poor sanitary conditions, especially under conditions of 
crowding. This suggests that sanitary infrastructure and road sweeping is appreciated more for 
aesthetic reasons than because of awareness of their public health benefits.   
 
This study has several policy implications. The most pressing implication is that much needs to 
be done through health education outreach to make citizens aware of the connection between 
sanitation and their own wellbeing in terms of exposure to disease. At present, even policymakers 
at the highest levels show a lack of awareness of these issues: for example, the new National 
Employment Guarantee Scheme which provides money to GPs to provide employment to 
villagers does not permit workers to be hired to work on village cleaning projects. Such 
awareness will encourage greater demand for and monitoring of panchayats’ sanitary services, 
and also trigger personal behavioral changes that help keep villages cleaner and healthier. It will 
also help ensure that GP decisions on village sanitation are based more on considerations of 
maximizing their public health impact, and less on aesthetic considerations. A second policy 
implication is that the government needs to inform citizens about the sanitation responsibilities of 
their local governments. Thirdly, local bye-laws on sanitation are needed to enable citizens and 
local governments understand concretely their respective tasks in assuring sanitation, and be able 
to hold each other accountable for this. And fourthly, the government needs to strengthen 
accountability mechanisms, and provide incentives, to reduce the partisan allocation of scarce 
infrastructure resources, and resources for village cleaning.   
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Table 1:  Gram Panchayat members’ assessment of the fraction of villages where public 
health and sanitation tasks were ever done 
 
Task Ever done 
Spraying for 
mosquitoes 
0.37 
Clearing water 
accumulation 
0.26 
Drinking water 
chlorination 
0.59 
Cleaning drinking 
water tanks 
0.71 
Garbage disposal 0.23 
Road cleaning 0.34 
Drain cleaning 0.39 
 
 
Table 2:  Gram Panchayat members’ perception of who is responsible for village public 
health and sanitation (%) 
 Task Gram 
Panchayat 
Higher Panchayat / 
line agencies 
Individual / 
Community 
Don't 
know 
Sum of 
percentages 
Spraying for 
mosquitoes 
80 10 1 13 104 
Clearing water 
accumulation 
73 14 2 16 105 
Drinking water 
chlorination 
78 13 3 10 104 
Cleaning drinking 
water tanks 
85 8 3 7 103 
Garbage disposal 61 2 7 32 102 
Road cleaning 82 2 5 15 104 
Drain cleaning 86 2 4 10 102 
Note: The sum of percentages is over 100 because respondents were allowed to report more than 
one responsible agent.   
 
 
 
 
Table 3  Summary statistics: Road level outcomes 
Number of 
roads 
Road has 
drain 
Road is 
paved 
Road is 
moderately 
clean 
No garbage 
on road 
Road has 
unclogged 
drain (cond) 
10408 0.28 0.47 0.84 0.68 0.90 
Note: “Road is moderately clean” is derived from a direct observation variable, which quantifies 
the field worker’s overall perception of the road’s cleanliness. The field worker is thereby asked 
to note whether the road is “clean”, “somewhat clean”, or “dirty”. We have coded “moderately 
clean” as being not “dirty”. This measure therefore has some overlap with the variable “no 
garbage on road”. 
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Table 4:  Gram Panchayat members’ perception of the GP’s responsibility for public health 
and sanitation, by village characteristics (block f.e.) 
 
Spraying 
for 
mosquitoes 
Clearing 
water 
accumulation 
Chlorinating 
drinking 
water tanks 
Cleaning 
drinking 
water 
tanks 
Garbage 
disposal 
Drain 
cleaning 
Road 
cleaning 
Population -0.025 0.007 -0.033 -0.044* 0.080*** 0.033 0.048** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 
Literacy rate 0.339* -0.041 -0.044 0.589*** -0.107 -0.015 0.212 
 (0.198) (0.229) (0.213) (0.205) (0.238) (0.265) (0.209) 
Population density 0.004* -0.001 0.004* 0.003* 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fraction SC/ST -0.050 -0.020 -0.126 -0.164* -0.010 -0.026 0.089* 
 (0.074) (0.082) (0.110) (0.085) (0.089) (0.087) (0.051) 
GP head’s village 0.034 -0.025 0.033 -0.012 -0.046 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.033) 
GP HQ in village -0.034 0.013 0.024 0.127*** -0.030 -0.033 0.010 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.047) (0.049) (0.045) (0.042) 
Oligarchy -0.340** -0.214 -0.128 -0.467* 0.134 0.035 0.378** 
 (0.168) (0.233) (0.214) (0.238) (0.212) (0.216) (0.183) 
Upper land prop. -0.005 -0.056 0.044 0.002 -0.044 -0.052 0.056 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.069) (0.058) (0.074) (0.054) (0.050) 
adjR-squared 0.446 0.518 0.257 0.321 0.513 0.434 0.454 
N 425 349 395 372 437 323 437 
 
Notes:   
1) controls included but not reported: whether the GP Presidency is reserved for women, scheduled or 
“backward” castes, fraction landless, number of castes, Gram Panchayat headman characteristics (age, 
education, wealth, experience) 
2) standard errors clustered at Gram Panchayat level in parenthesis         
3) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5% 
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Table 5:  Road level regressions: block fixed effects: linear probability   
 
  
Road has 
drain 
Road is 
paved 
Road is 
moderately 
clean 
No 
garbage 
on road 
Road has 
unclogged 
drain 
(cond) 
population 0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.012* 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
literacy rate  0.158 -0.097 0.140 0.128 -0.041 
 (0.101) (0.116) (0.105) (0.125) (0.141) 
pop density 0.007*** 0.003 0.002** 0.000 -0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
fraction scst -0.021 0.047 -0.017 0.166*** -0.207*** 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.035) (0.055) (0.068) 
GP head's village 0.053*** 0.028* 0.037** 0.060*** -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) 
GP HQ in village 0.022 0.047** -0.027 -0.021 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.031) 
oligarchy (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.031) 
 (0.074) (0.092) (0.074) (0.099) (0.220) 
upper land proportion -0.038 0.017 0.071*** -0.027 -0.040 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.025) (0.034) (0.047) 
psR-squared 0.239 0.116 0.116 0.276 0.222 
N 8452 8452 8398 8407 2038 
Notes:  
1) upper caste roadside as omitted category 
2) drain regressions conditional on road having drain 
3) inst roadside indicates whether a school/bank/post office is by the roadside 
4) controls included but not reported: reservation status, fraction landless, number of castes, Gram 
Panchayat head characteristics (age, edu, wealth, experience), road characteristics (mixed caste road, 
muslim road, scst road, politician road, road with major institution, length of road) 
5) standard errors clustered at colony level in parenthesis 
6) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
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Table 6:   Road level regressions: village fixed effects: linear probability 
 
  
road has 
drain road paved 
road is 
moderately 
clean 
no 
garbage 
on road 
road with 
unclogged 
drain (cond) 
mixed caste road -0.004 0.032* 0.003 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) 
muslim road -0.011 -0.057 -0.021 -0.024 0.000 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) 
scst road 0.015 -0.051** 0.001 -0.032* -0.025 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) 
politician road 0.078*** 0.052* 0.055*** -0.006 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) 
institution road 0.054* 0.120*** 0.045* 0.033 -0.034 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
length 0.115*** 0.165*** 0.010* 0.008 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
adjR-squared 0.336 0.232 0.286 0.494 0.492 
N 10026 10026 9971 9976 2244 
Notes:  
1) upper caste roadside as omitted category; 
2) drain regressions conditional on road having drain 
3) inst roadside indicates whether a school/bank/post office is by the roadside 
4) standard errors clustered at colony level in parenthesis 
5) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
